Monday, December 22, 2008

[Docket No. FDA–2008–D–0597] Draft Guidance for Industry: Small Entities Compliance Guide for Renderers—Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Food and Drug Administration [Docket No. FDA–2008–D–0597] Draft Guidance for Industry: Small Entities Compliance Guide for Renderers—Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed; Availability AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, HHS. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is announcing the availability of a draft guidance for industry #195, entitled ‘‘Draft Guidance for Industry: Small Entities Compliance Guide for Renderers—Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed.’’ This small entities compliance guide aids renderers in complying with the requirements of the final rule published in the Federal Register of April 25, 2008 (73 FR 22720). FDA’s goal is to strengthen existing safeguards to prevent the spread of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in U.S. cattle and to reduce the risk of human exposure to the BSE agent. DATES: Although you can comment on any guidance at any time (see 21 CFR 10.115(g)(5)), to ensure that the agency considers your comment on this draft guidance before it begins work on the final version of the guidance, submit written or electronic comments on the draft guidance by January 26, 2009. ADDRESSES: Submit written requests for single copies of the guidance to the Communications Staff (HFV–12), Center for Veterinary Medicine, Food and Drug Administration, 7519 Standish Pl., Rockville, MD 20855. Send one selfaddressed adhesive label to assist that office in processing your requests. Submit written comments on the draft guidance to the Division of Dockets Management (HFA–305), Food and Drug Administration, 5630 Fishers Lane, rm. 1061, Rockville, MD 20852. Submit electronic comments to http:// www.regulations.gov. See the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section for electronic access to the draft guidance document. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Shannon Jordre, Division of Compliance, Center for Veterinary Medicine (HFV–230), Food and Drug Administration, 7519 Standish Pl., Rockville, MD 20855, 240–276–9229, mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000301/!x-usc:mailto:Shannon.jordre@fda.hhs.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Background FDA is announcing the availability of a draft guidance for industry #195, entitled ‘‘Draft Guidance for Industry: Small Entities Compliance Guide for Renderers—Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed.’’ In the Federal Register of April 25, 2008 (73 FR 22720), FDA published a final rule entitled ‘‘Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed.’’ This VerDate Aug<31>2005 17:30 Nov 25, 2008 Jkt 217001 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\26NON1.SGM 26NON1 mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with NOTICES Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 229 / Wednesday, November 26, 2008 / Notices 72063 regulation is designed to further strengthen existing safeguards against the establishment and amplification of BSE, sometimes referred to as ‘‘Mad Cow Disease,’’ through animal feed. The regulation prohibits the use of certain cattle origin materials in the food or feed of all animals. FDA has prepared this draft Small Entities Compliance Guide in accordance with section 212 of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (Public Law 104–121). This document is intended to provide guidance to small businesses on the requirements of Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, new § 589.2001 and amended § 589.2000. II. Significance of Guidance FDA is issuing this small entities compliance guide as a level 1 draft guidance is being issued consistent with FDA’s good guidance practices regulation (21 CFR 10.115). The draft guidance, when finalized, will represent the agency’s current thinking on this topic. It does not create or confer any rights for or on any person and does not operate to bind FDA or the public. An alternative approach may be used if such approach satisfies the requirements of the applicable statutes and regulations. III. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 This draft guidance refers to previously approved collections of information found in FDA regulations. These collections of information are subject to review by the Office of Manag ent and Budget (OMB) under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501–3520). The collections of information in 21 CFR 589.2001 have been approved under OMB Control Number 0910–0627. IV. Comments Interested persons may submit to the Division of Dockets Management (see ADDRESSES) written or electronic comments regarding this document. Submit a single copy of electronic comments or two paper copies of any mailed comments, except that individuals may submit one paper copy. Comments are to be identified with the docket number found in brackets in the heading of this document. Received comments may be seen in the Division of Dockets Management between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday. Please note that on January 15, 2008, the FDA Division of Dockets Management Web site transitioned to the Federal Dockets Management System (FDMS). FDMS is a Government-wide, electronic docket management system. Electronic comments or submissions will be accepted by FDA only through FDMS at http://www.regulations.gov. IV. Electronic Access Persons with access to the Internet may obtain the draft guidance at either http://www.fda.gov/cvm or http:// www.regulations.gov. Dated: November 20, 2008. Jeffrey Shuren, Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning. [FR Doc. E8–28189 Filed 11–25–08; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4160–01–S



http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-28189.pdf




Greetings,


I kindly wish to submit the following to [Docket No. FDA–2008–D–0597] ;

I would kindly like to once again comment on the failed attempts of the FDA et al to stop the spread of animal TSEs, including BSE, through the legal, and illegal feeding practices, of feeding animal protein to livestock for human and animal consumption. Since the terribly flawed, partial, and voluntary August 4, 1997 ruminant to ruminant feed ban was put into place, literally 100s of thousands of tons of banned animal protein has been fed out into commerce, even as late as 2007, when some 10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. NOW, how much of that product that went out into commerce was fed out to cattle, and how much was ever recovered ? AND to think that feeding blood to livestock producing animals is still legal, when scientific study after study shows that TSEs are easily transmitted via blood. IT is absolutely unacceptable that still in 2008, the USA is still feeding highly suspect mad cow feed to USA cattle, and other livestock producing animals. Especially when the last two cases of BSE that were allowed to be tested and reported were of the atypical BSE category, of which we now know the atypical BSE is more virulent than that of the typical BSE, and when ARS research on the atypical BSE said long ago the SRM rules may need to be changed, IF the atypical BSE were to be proven to be more virulent. Why do we continue to flounder? I have submitted to these BSE feed dockets until I am blue in the face, and still to date, they still debate an issue that should have been settled long ago. IT's a fine example of how big ag, big industry, have a stranglehold on sound science and policy making thereof. How many millions of animals and humans have been needlessly exposed to this TSE agent, due to nothing more than ignorance and greed, simply because of a disease that is 100% fatal, but one that has such a long incubation period. For the government and industry as a whole, to continue to flagrantly violate said rules and regulations, in my opinion, should be regarded as criminal, and treated as such. People are dying. ...


Please see references ;


10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

REASON

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI

REASON

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007



http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html




2006 WAS A BANNER YEAR ALSO FOR MAD COW FEED BAN VIOLATIONS ''IN COMMERCE''

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV
Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST

snip...

see listings and references of enormous amounts of banned mad cow protein 'in commerce' in 2006 and 2005 ;

see full text ;

Friday, April 25, 2008

Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed [Docket No. 2002N-0273] (Formerly Docket No. 02N-0273) RIN 0910-AF46



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/04/substances-prohibited-from-use-in.html



SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS



http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2008/02/specified-risk-materials-srm.html



0C3.01


Transmission of atypical BSE to Microcebus murinus, a non-human primate: Development of clinical symptoms and tissue distribution of PrPres

Background: Atypical BSE cases have been observed in Europe, Japan and North America. They differ in their PrPres profiles from those found in classical BSE. These atypical cases fall into 2 types, depending on the molecular mass of the unglycosylated PrPres band observed by Western blot: the L -type (lower molecular mass than the typical BSE cases) and H-type (higher molecular mass than the typical BSE cases).

Objectives and Methods: In order to see if the atypical BSE cases were transmissible to primates, either animals (were intracerebrally inoculated with 50 ul of a 10% brain homogenates of two atypical French BSE case, a H-type (2 males and 2 females) and a L-type (2 males and 2 females).

Results: Only one of the four lemurs challenged with H-type BSE died without clinical signs after 19 months post inoculation (mpi), whereas all the 4 animals inoculated with L -type BSE died at 19 mpi (2 males) and 22 mpi (2 females). Three months before their sacrifice, they developed blindness, tremor, abnormal posture, incoordinated movements, balance loss. Symptoms got worse according to the disease progression, until severe ataxia. The brain tissue were biochemically and immunocytochemically investigated for PrPres. For the H-type, spongiform changes without PrPres accumulation were observed in the brainstem. However Western blot analysis did not allow to detect PrPres into the brain. For the L-type, severe spongiosis was evidenced into the thalamus, the striatum, the mesencephalon, and the brainstem. whereas into the cortex the spongiosis was evidenced, but the Vacuolisation was weaker. Strong deposits of PrPres were detected by western blot, PET-blot and immunocytochemistry in the CNS: dense accumulation was observed into the thalamus, the striatum, and the hippocampus whereas in the cerebral cortex, PrPres was prominently accumulated in plaques. Western blot analysis also readily confirmed the presence of protease-resistant prion protein.

Conclusions: L-type infected lemurs showed survival times considerably shorter than for classical BSE strain, indicating that the disease is caused by a very virulent distinct prion strain in a model of non human primate.



http://www.neuroprion.org/resources/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2008/abstract-book-prion2008.pdf




look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;


Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates

Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys

Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.

snip...

BSE bovine brain inoculum 100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%) Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%) RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%) PrPres biochemical detection The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal. Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula

Published online January 27, 2005



http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa




P04.27

Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route

Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3; Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center, Germany

Background:

In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.

Aims:

The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose (MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to identify possible biomarkers.

Methods:

Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study, animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).

Results:

In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the detection of biomarkers.

Conclusions:

Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop simian v CJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.

The work referenced was performed in partial fulfillment of the study “BSE in primates“ supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).



http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf




Calves were challenged by mouth with homogenised brain from confirmed cases of BSE. Some received 300g (3 doses of 100g), some 100g, 10g or 1g. They were then left to develop BSE, but were not subjected to the normal stresses that they might have encountered in a dairy herd. Animals in all four groups developed BSE. There has been a considerable spread of incubation period in some of the groups, but it appears as if those in the 1 and 10g challenge groups most closely fit the picture of incubation periods seen in the epidemic. Experiments in progress indicate that oral infection can occur in some animals with doses as low as 0.01g and 0.001g. .........



http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/science-research/pathog.html#dose




It is clear that the designing scientists must also have shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s145d.pdf




6. It also appears to me that Mr Bradley's answer (that it would take less than say 100 grams) was probably given with the benefit of hindsight; particularly if one considers that later in the same answer Mr Bradley expresses his surprise that it could take as little of 1 gram of brain to cause BSE by the oral route within the same species. This information did not become available until the "attack rate" experiment had been completed in 1995/96. This was a titration experiment designed to ascertain the infective dose. A range of dosages was used to ensure that the actual result was within both a lower and an upper limit within the study and the designing scientists would not have expected all the dose levels to trigger infection. The dose ranges chosen by the most informed scientists at that time ranged from 1 gram to three times one hundred grams. It is clear that the designing scientists must have also shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s147f.pdf




1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8

Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to nonhuman primates.

Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.

Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation.

PMID: 6997404



http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=6997404&dopt=Abstract




12/10/76 AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTE ON SCRAPIE Office Note CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR PETER WILDY

snip...

A The Present Position with respect to Scrapie A] The Problem

Scrapie is a natural disease of sheep and goats. It is a slow and inexorably progressive degenerative disorder of the nervous system and it ia fatal. It is enzootic in the United Kingdom but not in all countries.

The field problem has been reviewed by a MAFF working group (ARC 35/77). It is difficult to assess the incidence in Britain for a variety of reasons but the disease causes serious financial loss; it is estimated that it cost Swaledale breeders alone $l.7 M during the five years 1971-1975. A further inestimable loss arises from the closure of certain export markets, in particular those of the United States, to British sheep.

It is clear that scrapie in sheep is important commercially and for that reason alone effective measures to control it should be devised as quickly as possible.

Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical to the once which characterise the human dementias"

Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the acrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer grievously.

snip...

76/10.12/4.6



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1976/10/12004001.pdf




Epidemiology of Scrapie in the United States 1977




http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m08b/tab64.pdf




http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/




CHAPTER 3 Animal Disease Eradication Programs and Control and Certification Programs

snip...

In FY 2007, two field cases, one validation study case, and two RSSS cases were consistent with a variant of the disease known as Nor98 scrapie.1 These five cases originated from flocks in California, Minnesota, Colorado, Wyoming, and Indiana, respectively.

snip...



http://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/animal_health/content/printable_version/AHR_Web_PDF_07/D_Chapter_3.pdf



NOR-98 Scrapie FY 2008 to date 1



http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_diseases/scrapie/downloads/monthly_scrapie_rpt.pps



NOR-98 ATYPICAL SCRAPIE USA UPDATE AS AT OCT 2007



http://nor-98.blogspot.com/



FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.



http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2001/NEW00752.html



http://www.fda.gov/ora/about/enf_story/archive/2001/ch5/default.htm




If transmission occurs, tissue distribution comparisons will be made between cattle infected with the atypical BSE isolate and the U.S. BSE isolate. Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal.



http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=408490




PLEASE BE ADVISED, also, such 'significant objectionable conditions or practices' such as this, allow millions and millions of pounds of banned ruminant feed into commerce, such as the one in 2007. I suppose this is why they DO NOT release such data anymore i.e. in tonnage or pounds, much too embarrassing considering .005 grams is lethal for a cow. ...TSS


TRANSFUSION MEDICINE

Prion diseases are efficiently transmitted by blood transfusion in sheep

Fiona Houston1, Sandra McCutcheon1, Wilfred Goldmann2, Angela Chong2, James Foster2, Silvia Sisó3, Lorenzo González3, Martin Jeffrey3, and Nora Hunter2 1 Neuropathogenesis Division, Roslin Institute, Compton, United Kingdom; 2 Neuropathogenesis Division, Roslin Institute, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom; and 3 Lasswade Laboratory, Veterinary Laboratories Agency, Penicuik, United Kingdom

The emergence of variant Creutzfeld-Jakob disease, following on from the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) epidemic, led to concerns about the potential risk of iatrogenic transmission of disease by blood transfusion and the introduction of costly control measures to protect blood supplies. We previously reported preliminary data demonstrating the transmission of BSE and natural scrapie by blood transfusion in sheep. The final results of this experiment, reported here, give unexpectedly high transmission rates by transfusion of 36% for BSE and 43% for scrapie. A proportion of BSE-infected tranfusion recipients (3 of 8) survived for up to 7 years without showing clinical signs of disease. The majority of transmissions resulted from blood collected from donors at more than 50% of the estimated incubation period. The high transmission rates and relatively short and consistent incubation periods in clinically positive recipients suggest that infectivity titers in blood were substantial and/or that blood transfusion is an efficient method of transmission. This experiment has established the value of using sheep as a model for studying transmission of variant Creutzfeld-Jakob disease by blood products in humans.



http://bloodjournal.hematologylibrary.org/cgi/content/abstract/112/12/4739?ct




Biochim Biophys Acta. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2008 December 9. Published in final edited form as: Biochim Biophys Acta. 2007 June; 1772(6): 681-691. Published online 2006 December 15. doi: 10.1016/j.bbadis.2006.12.006. PMCID: PMC2597801 NIHMSID: NIHMS25810

Copyright notice and Disclaimer

The prion strain phenomenon: Molecular basis and unprecedented features

Rodrigo Morales,1,2 Karim Abid,1 and Claudio Soto1# 1 Protein Misfolding Disorders Laboratory, George and Cynthia Mitchell Center for Neurodegenerative diseases, Departments of Neurology, Neuroscience & Cell Biology and Biochemistry & Molecular Biology, University of Texas Medical Branch, 301 University Boulevard, Galveston, Texas, 77555-0646, USA 2 Facultad de Ciencias, Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile #To whom correspondence should be addressed at Email: mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000301/!x-usc:mailto:clsoto@utmb.edu The publisher's final edited version of this article is available at Biochim Biophys Acta. See other articles in PMC that cite the published article.

Abstract

Prions are unconventional infectious agents responsible for transmissible spongiform encephalopathies. Compelling evidences indicate that prions are composed exclusively by a misfolded form of the prion protein (PrPSc) that replicates in the absence of nucleic acids. One of the most challenging problems for the prion hypothesis is the existence of different strains of the infectious agent. Prion strains have been characterized in most of the species. Biochemical characteristics of PrPSc used to identify each strain include glycosylation profile, electrophoretic mobility, protease resistance, and sedimentation. In vivo, prion strains can be differentiated by the clinical signs, incubation period after inoculation and the vacuolation lesion profiles in the brain of affected animals. Sources of prion strain diversity are the inherent conformational flexibility of the prion protein, the presence of PrP polymorphisms and inter-species transmissibility. The existence of the strain phenomenon is not only a scientific challenge, but it also represents a serious risk for public health. The dynamic nature and inter-relations between strains and the potential for the generation of a very large number of new prion strains is the perfect recipe for the emergence of extremely dangerous new infectious agents.

snip...

BSE has not only been transmitted to humans. The extensive use of cow-derived material for feeding other animals led to the generation of new diseases in exotic felines such as tiger and cheetah, non human primates, and domestic cats [52,57-60]. As it was mentioned before, the transmission of BSE into these different species could create many new prion strains, each one of them with particular biological and biochemical characteristics and thus a potentially new hazard for human health. Successful transmission of BSE in pigs has been described [61,62] and also in transgenic mice expressing pig PrP (PoPrP) [63]. Porcine derivates are widely consumed and the hypothetic case of "mad pigs" could increase the events of zoonotic transmission of prions to humans. Fortunately, transmission of BSE to pigs is possible only in very drastic conditions, not likely to be occurring naturally [62,63]. More frightening is perhaps the possibility that BSE has been passed into sheep and goats. Studies have already shown that this transmission is possible and actually relatively easy and worrisomely produces a disease clinically similar to scrapie [64]. The cattle origin of this new scrapie makes possible that the new strain may be transmissible to humans. Transmission experiments of BSE infected sheep brain homogenate into human transgenic animal models are currently ongoing in several laboratories. It is very important to note that all materials generated by transmission of BSE in experimental and natural cases show similar biochemical behavior compared to the original inoculum [65], suggesting that all these new generated infectious agents could potentially be hazardous for humans. The origin of BSE is still a mystery. Abundant evidence supports the hypothesis that BSE was produced by cattle feeding with scrapie derivated material [66,67], indicating that bovine PrPSc might be a "conformational intermediary" between ovine PrPSc and human PrPC.

There is currently no mean to predict which will be the conformation of a newly generated strain and how this new PrPSc conformation could affect other species. One interesting new prion disease is CWD, a disease affecting farm and wild species of cervids [68,69]. The origin of CWD and its potential to transmit to humans are currently unknown. This is worrisome, considering that CWD has became endemic in some parts of USA and the number of cases continues to increase [69]. It is presumed that a large number of hunters in the US have been in contact or consumed CWD-infected meat [70]. CWD transmissibility studies have been performed in many species in order to predict how this disease could be spread by consumption of CWD meat [71-73]. In these studies, a special attention has been done to scavenging animals [74], which are presumed to be exposed to high concentration of cervid prions, resulting in the putative generation of many new forms of TSEs. Fortunately negative results were obtained in one experiment done in raccoons infected with CWD [74]. Transmission of CWD to humans cannot be ruled out at present and a similar infective episode to BSE involving CWD could result in catastrophic events, spreading the disease in a very dangerous way through the human population. No clinical evidence linking CWD exposed humans and CJD patients have been found [70], but experimental inoculation of CWD prions into squirrel monkeys propagated the disease [71]. It is important to mention that the species barrier between humans and cervids appears to be greater than with cattle, as judged by experiments with transgenic mice models [75]. Finally, it is important to be aware about CWD transmissibility to other species in which a "conformational intermediary" could be formed, facilitating human infection.

SNIP...

VI. Unique features of prion strains

The biological and infectious characteristics of prions are dramatically different to the conventional infectious agents. These differences are manifested in the prion strains phenomenon in unique and unprecedented features, such as for example strain adaptation and memory, the coexistence and competition of prion strains, among others. In this section, some of these interesting phenomena will be briefly described.

Adaptation of Prion strains

Interspecies transmission of prions could result in the emergence of more than one variety of infectious material. All new collected infectious agents could present particular strain characteristics. That is the case of DY and HY prion strains generation [13,16]. When interspecies transmission of prions occurs, serial passages in the new host are needed in order to stabilize the characteristics of new generated infectious material. In the case of TME transmission in hamsters, at least four serial passages in the new species were required for stabilization [13]. The first passage was characterized by long incubation periods and a dominance of a 19 KDa fragment when newly obtained PrPSc was analyzed after PK digestion. In the three first passages, clinical symptoms were not characteristic of the hamster-adapted HY or DY TME strains. This phenotype was attributed to the combination effects of both strains replicating simultaneously. Thereafter, each of the strains was stabilized in some of the animals and once they are adapted and stabilized, they can be serially propagated in vivo and the characteristics are maintained. It is accepted that both strains present differential conversion kinetics in vitro, with DY being the slowest and HY the fastest [124]. For this reason, in order to select efficiently this prion strain, limit dilutions must be performed [13]. In that way, the most abundant and less convertible DY is favored against the less abundant but fastest HY strain.

Co-existence of prion strains

Related to the above, it has been shown that two or more prion strains can co-exist in natural cases of TSE. Co-existence of prion strains has been found in sporadic cases of CJD [113, 125]. Analyses of several sCJD tissue showed that different biochemical profiles of PrPSc could be found in different brain areas from the same patient [113]. Co-existence of prion strains was mainly observed in patient heterozygous for codon 129 [113]. As many as 50% of these patients present different types of PrPSc in their brains, whereas 9% of MM patients were positive for co-existence of strains. On the other hand, more than one PrPSc type was not observed in VV patients [113].

The biochemical and structural properties of the protein seem to be the major cause of this differential distribution. This observation may explain why sCJD is so heterogeneous in terms of clinical manifestation [34,126,127]. In a recent publication by Bishop et al. [107], vCJD infected transgenic mice expressing human PrPC, present changes in their PrPSc and vacuolation patterns in the brain according to their polymorphic classification for codon 129.

Competition of prion strains

In particular experimental conditions, some prion strains can extend their specific incubation period when co-infected with another strain. Long incubation period prions increase the incubation period of "faster" prions. This phenomenon of "competition of prion strains" has been observed in mice and hamster. In mice, competition between 22A and 22C strains was reported in 1975 by Dickinson et al. [128]. In this study, RIII mice (homozygous for sincs7 allele) were used. 22A and 22C showed long and short incubation period (550 and 230 days), respectively. When 22C strain was intraperitoneally inoculated 100, 200 and 300 days after intraperitoneal administration of the 22A agent, all three experimental groups resulted in Morales et al. Page 8 Biochim Biophys Acta. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2008 December 9. NIH-PA Author Manuscript NIH-PA Author Manuscript NIH-PA Author Manuscript incubation periods and lesion patterns matching 22A prions, suggesting that 22C prions were degraded or excreted, in animals previously infected by 22A. Similar results were obtained by Kimberlin and Walker in 1985 [129] using a different strain of sincs7 mice. These authors treated mice using 22A and 22C prion strain. Before inoculation, 22A was treated with different chemical and physical agents in order to see if the "competitor" or "blocking" characteristics of 22A were maintained. From all treatments, 12M urea was shown to almost abolish the blocking properties of 22A agent. This information suggests that infective properties of long incubation period agent are strictly necessary in order to increase the incubation period of faster prions.

In hamster, similar observations were reported using DY and HY [130]. DY prion strain was inoculated 30 and 60 days prior intraperitoneal inoculation of HY at three different doses. When incubation periods of HY inoculated control group were compared with the animals inoculated at 60 days with DY, significant differences in the incubation periods were found, especially when HY prions were administrated in a higher dose [130]. On the other hand no differences were observed in the case of intranerve inoculation, revealing that competition phenomenon occurs only when peripheral inoculation is performed. These results are surprising considering the fact that DY was reported not to be infectious when intraperitoneally inoculated in hamsters [130]. This data suggest that replication of DY is occurring in peripheral tissues but is not able to reach the central nervous system.

In general, the principal variables that need to be observed for a successful competition are the route of infection, the interval between injections and the particular strains and doses of agent used. Prolongation of incubation periods in TSE are therapeutically beneficial and several strategies are under development to reach this aim, including antibodies, beta-sheet breakers, and other chemical agents [131-133]. The experimental evidence described above suggests that prions could be potentially useful for this purpose. In order to prevent spread of prion disease in cattle or humans, prion strains with incubation periods longer than species' lifespan could be used to slowdown the replication of BSE or vCJD prions.

VII. Concluding Remarks

The existence of different strains of an infectious agent composed exclusively of a protein has been one of the most puzzling issues in the prion field. If is already difficult to understand how a protein can adopt two stable and different folded structures and that one of them can transform the other one into itself, it is unthinkable that the misfolded form can in turn adopt multiple conformations with distinct properties. Yet, compelling scientific evidence support the idea that PrP can adopt numerous folding patterns that can faithfully replicate and produce different diseases. The existence of the strain phenomenon is not only a scientific challenge, but it also represents a serious risk for public health. The dynamic nature and inter-relations between strains and the potential for the generation of many new prion strains depending on the polymorphisms and the crossing of species barrier is the perfect recipe for the emergence of extremely dangerous new infectious agents. Although, substantial progress has been made in understanding the prion strains phenomenon, there are many open questions that need urgent answers, including: what are the structural basis of prion strains?; how are the phenomena of strain adaptation and memory enciphered in the conformation of the prion agent?; to what species can a given prion strain be transmissible?; what other cellular factors control the origin and properties of prion strains?. ...SNIP...END



http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?tool=pmcentrez&artid=2597801&rendertype=abstract



http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=2597801&blobtype=pdf




Friday, December 05, 2008

Detection of Prion Infectivity in Fat Tissues of Scrapie-Infected Mice



http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2008/12/detection-of-prion-infectivity-in-fat.html




Friday, December 12, 2008

Prions in Milk from Ewes Incubating Natural Scrapie



http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2008/12/prions-in-milk-from-ewes-incubating.html





Evaluation of the Human Transmission Risk of an Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Prion Strain

Qingzhong Kong,1* Mengjie Zheng,1 Cristina Casalone,2 Liuting Qing,1 Shenghai Huang,1? Bikram Chakraborty,1 Ping Wang,1 Fusong Chen,1 Ignazio Cali,1 Cristiano Corona,2 Francesca Martucci,2 Barbara Iulini,2 Pierluigi Acutis,2 Lan Wang,1 Jingjing Liang,1 Meiling Wang,1 Xinyi Li,1 Salvatore Monaco,3 Gianluigi Zanusso,3 Wen-Quan Zou,1 Maria Caramelli,2 and Pierluigi Gambetti1* Department of Pathology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio 44106,1 CEA, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, 10154 Torino, Italy,2 Department of Neurological and Visual Sciences, University of Verona, 37134 Verona, Italy3 *Corresponding author. Mailing address: Department of Pathology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH 44106. Phone for Pierluigi Gambetti: (216) 368-0586. Fax: (216) 368-2546. E-mail: mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000301/!x-usc:mailto:pxg13@case.edu . Phone for Qingzhong Kong: (216) 368-1756. Fax: (216) 368-2546. E-mail: mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000301/!x-usc:mailto:qxk2@case.edu ?Present address: Department of Patient Education and Health Information, Cleveland Clinic Foundation, Cleveland, OH 44195. Received November 30, 2007; Accepted January 16, 2008.

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), the prion disease in cattle, was widely believed to be caused by only one strain, BSE-C. BSE-C causes the fatal prion disease named new variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease in humans. Two atypical BSE strains, bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy (BASE, also named BSE-L) and BSE-H, have been discovered in several countries since 2004; their transmissibility and phenotypes in humans are unknown. We investigated the infectivity and human phenotype of BASE strains by inoculating transgenic (Tg) mice expressing the human prion protein with brain homogenates from two BASE strain-infected cattle. Sixty percent of the inoculated Tg mice became infected after 20 to 22 months of incubation, a transmission rate higher than those reported for BSE-C. A quarter of BASE strain-infected Tg mice, but none of the Tg mice infected with prions causing a sporadic human prion disease, showed the presence of pathogenic prion protein isoforms in the spleen, indicating that the BASE prion is intrinsically lymphotropic. The pathological prion protein isoforms in BASE strain-infected humanized Tg mouse brains are different from those from the original cattle BASE or sporadic human prion disease. Minimal brain spongiosis and long incubation times are observed for the BASE strain-infected Tg mice. These results suggest that in humans, the BASE strain is a more virulent BSE strain and likely lymphotropic.

http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=2268471


Thursday, December 04, 2008 2:37 PM

"we have found that H-BSE can infect humans."

personal communication with Professor Kong. ...TSS


November 25, 2008

Update On Feed Enforcement Activities To Limit The Spread Of BSE



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/11/november-2008-update-on-feed.html




"the biochemical signature of PrPres in the BASE-inoculated animal was found to have a higher proteinase K sensitivity of the octa-repeat region. We found the same biochemical signature in three of four human patients with sporadic CJD and an MM type 2 PrP genotype who lived in the same country as the infected bovine." ... interesting. ... TSS


Thursday, June 05, 2008

Review on the epidemiology and dynamics of BSE epidemics

Vet. Res. (2008) 39:15 www.vetres.org DOI: 10.1051/vetres:2007053 c INRA, EDP Sciences, 2008 Review article

snip...

And last but not least, similarities of PrPres between Htype BSE and human prion diseases like CJD or GSS have been put forward [10], as well as between L-type BSE and CJD [17]. These findings raise questions about the origin and inter species transmission of these prion diseases that were discovered through the BSE active surveillance.

snip...

Cases of atypical BSE have only been found in countries having implemented large active surveillance programs. As of 1st September 2007, 36 cases (16 H, 20 L) have been described all over the world in cattle: Belgium (1 L) [23], Canada (1 H)15, Denmark (1 L)16, France (8 H, 6 L)17, Germany (1 H, 1 L) [13], Italy (3 L)18, Japan (1 L) [71], Netherlands (1 H, 2 L)19, Poland (1 H, 6 L)20, Sweden (1 H)21, United Kingdom (1 H)22, and USA (2 H)23. Another H-type case has been found in a 19 year old miniature zebu in a zoological park in Switzerland [56]. It is noteworthy that atypical cases have been found in countries that did not experience classical BSE so far, like Sweden, or in which only few cases of classical BSE have been found, like Canada or the USA.

And last but not least, similarities of PrPres between Htype BSE and human prion diseases like CJD or GSS have been put forward [10], as well as between L-type BSE and CJD [17]. These findings raise questions about the origin and inter species transmission of these prion diseases that were discovered through the BSE active surveillance.

full text 18 pages ;



http://www.vetres.org/index.php?option=article&access=standard&Itemid=129&url=/articles/vetres/pdf/2008/04/v07232.pdf




please see full text ;



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/06/review-on-epidemiology-and-dynamics-of.html




***Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.***

Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center

An Update from Stephen M. Sergay, MB, BCh & Pierluigi Gambetti, MD

April 3, 2008



http://www.aan.com/news/?event=read&article_id=4397&page=72.45.45




In this context, a word is in order about the US testing program. After the discovery of the first (imported) cow in 2003, the magnitude of testing was much increased, reaching a level of >400,000 tests in 2005 (Figure 4). Neither of the 2 more recently indigenously infected older animals with nonspecific clinical features would have been detected without such testing, and neither would have been identified as atypical without confirmatory Western blots. Despite these facts, surveillance has now been decimated to 40,000 annual tests (USDA news release no. 0255.06, July 20, 2006) and invites the accusation that the United States will never know the true status of its involvement with BSE.

In short, a great deal of further work will need to be done before the phenotypic features and prevalence of atypical BSE are understood. More than a single strain may have been present from the beginning of the epidemic, but this possibility has been overlooked by virtue of the absence of widespread Western blot confirmatory testing of positive screening test results; or these new phenotypes may be found, at least in part, to result from infections at an older age by a typical BSE agent, rather than neonatal infections with new "strains" of BSE. Neither alternative has yet been investigated.



http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm




Wednesday, August 20, 2008

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Mad Cow Disease typical and atypical strains, was there a cover-up ?



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/08/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-mad.html




A New Prionopathy OR more of the same old BSe and sporadic CJD



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/08/new-prionopathy-or-more-of-same-old-bse.html




Communicated by: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

[In submitting these data, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. draws attention to the steady increase in the "type unknown" category, which, according to their definition, comprises cases in which vCJD could be excluded. The total of 26 cases for the current year (2007) is disturbing, possibly symptomatic of the circulation of novel agents. Characterization of these agents should be given a high priority. - Mod.CP]



http://pro-med.blogspot.com/2007/11/proahedr-prion-disease-update-2007-07.html



http://www.promedmail.org/pls/askus/f?p=2400:1001:6833194127530602005::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1010,39963




There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection.

He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.



http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm



http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf




sporadic Fatal Familial Insomnia



http://sporadicffi.blogspot.com/




JOURNAL OF NEUROLOGY

MARCH 26, 2003

RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob

disease in the United States

Email Terry S. Singeltary:

mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000301/!x-usc:mailto:flounder9@verizon.net

I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?



http://www.neurology.org/cgi/eletters/60/2/176#535




THE PATHOLOGICAL PROTEIN

Hardcover, 304 pages plus photos and illustrations. ISBN 0-387-95508-9

June 2003

BY Philip Yam

CHAPTER 14 LAYING ODDS

Answering critics like Terry Singeltary, who feels that the U.S. under- counts CJD, Schonberger conceded that the current surveillance system has errors but stated that most of the errors will be confined to the older population.



http://www.thepathologicalprotein.com/




Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally.

Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex

1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323. FREE FULL TEXT



http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/extract/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT



http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT




2 January 2000 British Medical Journal U.S. Scientist should be concerned with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as well



http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/320/7226/8/b#6117




15 November 1999 British Medical Journal vCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S.




http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/319/7220/1312/b#5406




Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease


http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/



USA PRION UNIT BLOG



http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/




Sunday, April 20, 2008 Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center April 3, 2008

Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.

see full text ;



http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2008/04/progress-report-from-national-prion.html




CJD TEXAS (cjd clusters)



http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/




USA WRITTEN CJD QUESTIONNAIRE ???



http://cjdquestionnaire.blogspot.com/





Attending Dr.: Date / Time Admitted : 12/14/97 1228

UTMB University of Texas Medical Branch Galveston, Texas 77555-0543 (409) 772-1238 Fax (409) 772-5683 Pathology Report

FINAL AUTOPSY DIAGNOSIS Autopsy' Office (409)772-2858

FINAL AUTOPSY DIAGNOSIS

I. Brain: Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, Heidenhain variant.



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/07/heidenhain-variant-creutzfeldt-jakob.html





2007

The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.



http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html




Friday, August 29, 2008

CREEKSTONE VS USDA COURT OF APPEALS, BUSH SAYS, NO WAY, NO HOW



http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/08/creekstone-vs-usda-court-of-appeals.html




Sunday, March 16, 2008

MAD COW DISEASE terminology UK c-BSE (typical), atypical BSE H or L, and or Italian L-BASE



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/03/mad-cow-disease-terminology-uk-c-bse.html




HUMAN and ANIMAL TSE Classifications i.e. mad cow disease and the UKBSEnvCJD only theory JUNE 2008

snip...

Tissue infectivity and strain typing of the many variants Manuscript of the human and animal TSEs are paramount in all variants of all TSE. There must be a proper classification that will differentiate between all these human TSE in order to do this. With the CDI and other more sensitive testing coming about, I only hope that my proposal will some day be taken seriously. ...

snip...



http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/06/human-and-animal-tse-classifications-ie.html





0C3.01

Transmission of atypical BSE to Microcebus murinus, a non-human primate: Development of clinical symptoms and tissue distribution of PrPres

Background: Atypical BSE cases have been observed in Europe, Japan and North America. They differ in their PrPres profiles from those found in classical BSE. These atypical cases fall into 2 types, depending on the molecular mass of the unglycosylated PrPres band observed by Western blot: the L -type (lower molecular mass than the typical BSE cases) and H-type (higher molecular mass than the typical BSE cases).

Objectives and Methods: In order to see if the atypical BSE cases were transmissible to primates, either animals (were intracerebrally inoculated with 50 ul of a 10% brain homogenates of two atypical French BSE case, a H-type (2 males and 2 females) and a L-type (2 males and 2 females).

Results: Only one of the four lemurs challenged with H-type BSE died without clinical signs after 19 months post inoculation (mpi), whereas all the 4 animals inoculated with L -type BSE died at 19 mpi (2 males) and 22 mpi (2 females). Three months before their sacrifice, they developed blindness, tremor, abnormal posture, incoordinated movements, balance loss. Symptoms got worse according to the disease progression, until severe ataxia. The brain tissue were biochemically and immunocytochemically investigated for PrPres. For the H-type, spongiform changes without PrPres accumulation were observed in the brainstem. However Western blot analysis did not allow to detect PrPres into the brain. For the L-type, severe spongiosis was evidenced into the thalamus, the striatum, the mesencephalon, and the brainstem. whereas into the cortex the spongiosis was evidenced, but the Vacuolisation was weaker. Strong deposits of PrPres were detected by western blot, PET-blot and immunocytochemistry in the CNS: dense accumulation was observed into the thalamus, the striatum, and the hippocampus whereas in the cerebral cortex, PrPres was prominently accumulated in plaques. Western blot analysis also readily confirmed the presence of protease-resistant prion protein.

Conclusions: L-type infected lemurs showed survival times considerably shorter than for classical BSE strain, indicating that the disease is caused by a very virulent distinct prion strain in a model of non human primate.



http://www.neuroprion.org/resources/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2008/abstract-book-prion2008.pdf



P7.09

Biochemical screening for identification of atypical bse in belgium, 1999-present

Authors

Alexandre DobIy: Caroline Rodeghiero, Riet Geeroms; Stephanie Durand, Jessica De Sloovere, Emanuel Yanopdenbosch, Stefan Roels,

Content

Background: Recently atypical forms of BSE have been described. Western blot analyses showed that, in comparison to the classic BSE (C-type), they are demonstrable by a higher or lower molecular weight of the unglycosylated PrPres. They Viere thus named H-type and L-type BSE (L-type is also called BASE). In addition they show a lower proportion of diglycosylated PrPres than C-type. These emerging types represent different strains of BSE. They show unique incubation periods and histological lesions. Such types have been described on different continents. Indeed they might correspond to "sporadic" forms of BSE. In 2004 we already described one L-type in Belgium.

Objective: We retrospectively analysed the bovines at least 7-year-old in the Belgian archive of BSE ­diagnosed cattle in order to determine the prevalence of the two types of atypical BSE in Belgium.

Methods: We analysed homogenates from 39 bovines of 93 months old in median (min: 84, max: 181 months). The most recent one was diagnosed in 2006. We used Western blot with a panel of anti-PrP antibodies (Ab). They detect different regions of the PrP protein, from N-terminal to C-terminal: 12B2, 9A2, Sha31. SAFB4, 94B4. Their combination is aimed at an efficient typing diagnostic. We detected bound Ab with SuperSignal West Dura (Pierce) and analysed PrPres, signals with an image-analysis software (Quantity One, Bio-Rad).

Results: The results are still under analysis. We will detail the most crucial characteristics for typing PrPres. These include 1) the apparent molecular mass of the an-, mono- and diglycosylated bands, 2) the binding affinity to the five Ab (e.g.12B2 for H-type), 3) the presence of a fourth (unglycosylated) band and 4) the glycoprofile based on the relative proportions of the visible bands.

Discussion: The emergence of atypical types of BSE is partially due to a better knowledge of prion strains and more efficient diagnostic techniques. As the area in the brain where the PrPres is deposited can differ drastically between the types, it is essential to ascertain that the sampling techniques and analyses are adapted to these new types. As these new strains seem more virulent than classic types, they represent one of the next challenges in the field of prions.



http://www.neuroprion.org/resources/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2008/abstract-book-prion2008.pdf



http://www.prion2008.com/




Tuesday, November 11, 2008

Transmission of atypical bovine prions to mice transgenic for human prion protein

DOI: 10.3201/eid1412.080941



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/11/transmission-of-atypical-bovine-prions.html




Wednesday, August 20, 2008

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Mad Cow Disease typical and atypical strains, was there a cover-up ?



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/08/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-mad.html




Tuesday, June 3, 2008

SCRAPIE USA UPDATE JUNE 2008 NOR-98 REPORTED PA



http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/06/scrapie-usa-update-june-2008-nor-98.html




SCRAPIE USA



http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/




Sunday, September 07, 2008

CWD LIVE TEST, and the political aspects or fallout of live testing for BSE in cattle in the USA



http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2008/09/cwd-live-test-and-political-aspects-or.html




Saturday, October 18, 2008

WYOMING STAR VALLEY MOOSE TESTS POSITIVE FOR CWD



http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2008/10/wyoming-star-valley-moose-tests.html



http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/




Friday, December 12, 2008

The prion strain phenomenon: Molecular basis and unprecedented features



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/prion-strain-phenomenon-molecular-basis.html




Docket Management Docket: 02N-0276 - Bioterrorism Preparedness; Registration of Food Facilities, Section 305 Comment Number: EC -254 Accepted - Volume 11



http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/DOCKETS/02n0276/02N-0276-EC-254.htm



http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0276/02N-0276-EC-254.htm




Docket Management Docket: 02N-0273 - Substances Prohibited From Use in

Animal Food or Feed; Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed

Comment Number: EC -10

Accepted - Volume 2



http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be07.html




PART 2



http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be09.html




Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION]



http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt





Thank You,

I am sincerely,

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518





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Small Entities Compliance Guide for Renderers; Substances Prohibited fromo Use in Animal Food or Feed - Draft Guidance Notification

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http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=SubmitComment&o=09000064807c0fd7

Sunday, November 30, 2008

November 2008 Update On Feed Enforcement Activities To Limit The Spread Of BSE

November 25, 2008

November 2008 Update On Feed Enforcement Activities To Limit The Spread Of BSE

To help prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalophathy (BSE) through feed in the United States, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) implemented a final rule that prohibits the use of most mammalian protein in feeds for ruminant animals. This rule, Title 21 Part 589.2000 of the Code of Federal Regulations, here called the Ruminant Feed Ban, became effective on August 4, 1997.

The following is an update on FDA enforcement activities regarding the ruminant feed ban. FDA's Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM) has assembled data from the inspections that have been conducted AND whose final inspection report has been recorded in the FDA's inspection database as of November 15, 2008. As of November 15, 2008, FDA had received over 66,000 inspection reports. The majority of these inspections (approximately 71%) were conducted by State feed control officials, with the remainder conducted by FDA officials.

Inspections conducted by FDA or State investigators are classified to reflect the compliance status at the time of the inspection based upon the objectionable conditions documented. These inspection conclusions are reported as Official Action Indicated (OAI), Voluntary Action Indicated (VAI), or No Action Indicated (NAI).

An OAI inspection classification occurs when significant objectionable conditions or practices were found and regulatory sanctions are warranted in order to address the establishment's lack of compliance with the regulation. An example of an OAI inspection classification would be findings of manufacturing procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with prohibited material. Inspections classified with OAI violations will be promptly re-inspected following the regulatory sanctions to determine whether adequate corrective actions have been implemented.

A VAI inspection classification occurs when objectionable conditions or practices were found that do not meet the threshold of regulatory significance, but do warrant advisory actions to inform the establishment of findings that should be voluntarily corrected. Inspections classified with VAI violations are more technical violations of the Ruminant Feed Ban. These include provisions such as minor recordkeeping lapses and conditions involving non-ruminant feeds.

An NAI inspection classification occurs when no objectionable conditions or practices were found during the inspection or the significance of the documented objectionable conditions found does not justify further actions.

The results to date are reported here both by “segment of industry” and “in total”. NOTE – A single firm can operate as more than one firm type. As a result, the categories of the different industry segments are not mutually exclusive.

RENDERERS

These firms are the first to handle and process (i.e., render) animal proteins and to send these processed materials to feed mills and/or protein blenders for use as a feed ingredient.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 267

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 155 (58% of those active firms inspected)

Of the 155 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:

0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI

3 firms (2.0%) were classified as VAI

LICENSED FEED MILLS

FDA licenses these feed mills to produce medicated feed products. The license is required to manufacture and distribute feed using certain potent drug products, usually those requiring some pre-slaughter withdrawal time. This licensing has nothing to do with handling prohibited materials under the feed ban regulation. A medicated feed license from FDA is not required to handle materials prohibited under the Ruminant Feed Ban.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 1.075

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 494 (46% of those active firms inspected)

Of the 494 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:

0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI

4 firms (0.8 %) were classified as VAI

FEED MILLS NOT LICENSED BY FDA

These feed mills are not licensed by the FDA to produce medicated feeds.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 5,290

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 2,685 (51% of those active firms inspected)

Of the 2,685 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:

0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI

29 firms (1.1%) were classified as VAI

PROTEIN BLENDERS

These firms blend rendered animal protein for the purpose of producing quality feed ingredients that will be used by feed mills.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 387

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 196 (51% of those active firms inspected)

Of the 196 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:

0 firms (0%) was classified as OAI

0 firms (0%) were classified as VAI

RENDERERS, FEED MILLS, AND PROTEIN BLENDERS MANUFACTURING WITH PROHIBITED MATERIAL

This category includes only those firms that actually use prohibited material to manufacture, process, or blend animal feed or feed ingredients.

Total number of active renderers, feed mills, and protein blenders whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 6,712

Number of active renderers, feed mills, and protein blenders processing with prohibited materials – 506 (7.5%)

Of the 506 active renderers, feed mills, and protein blenders processing with prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:

0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI

11 firms (2.2%) were classified as VAI

OTHER FIRMS INSPECTED

Examples of such firms include ruminant feeders, on-farm mixers, pet food manufacturers, animal feed salvagers, distributors, retailers, and animal feed transporters.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 21,865

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 7,295 (33% of those active firms inspected)

Of the 7,295 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:

0 firm (0%) were classified as OAI

113 firms (1.5%) were classified as VAI

TOTAL FIRMS

Note that a single firm can be reported under more than one firm category; therefore, the summation of the individual OAI/VAI firm categories will be more than the actual total number of OAI/VAI firms, as presented below.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 24,065

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 7,876 (33% of those active firms inspected)

Of the 7,876 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:

0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI

121 firms (1.5%) were classified as VAI



http://www.fda.gov/cvm/CVM_Updates/BseInspNov08.htm



unacceptable! in 2008, almost 2009, this many firms still in violation of mad cow feed ban rules. the infamous august 4, 1997 partial and voluntary mad cow feed ban was nothing more than ink on paper. ...TSS

Plasma & Serum Proteins Receive Continued FDA Approval

4/25/2008 APC, Inc. is pleased to advise our customers and industry partners that as anticipated, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) will continue to allow the use of bovine blood, plasma and serum proteins in ruminant feeds.

In April 2008 FDA announced the publication of its Final Rule for 21 CFR Part 589.2001 - Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed. FDA specifically stated in their opinion that, "FDA is not prohibiting the use of blood and blood products in animal feed because we believe such a prohibition would do very little to reduce the risk of BSE transmission."

Known as a leader in developing nutritional products for the swine industry, where 95% of pig starter diets in the United States contain functional proteins, APC has more recently developed their line of colostrum replacers, supplements, feed additives and milk replacer ingredients for calves. Products include plasma, serum and immunoglobulin concentrate based Acquire®, Lifeline®, Gammulin® and Nutrapro® used to optimize the health and performance of calves.

To view the full report for Final Rule 21 CFR Part 589.2001 visit:



http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/FDA-2002-N-0031-nfr.pdf



To view the complete Feed Rule 21 CFR Part 589 visit:



http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfcfr/CFRSearch.cfm?CFRPart=589&showFR=1



Friday, November 21, 2008 Plasma & Serum Proteins Receive Continued FDA Approval



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/11/plasma-serum-proteins-receive-continued.html



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/



TRANSFUSION MEDICINE

Prion diseases are efficiently transmitted by blood transfusion in sheep

Fiona Houston1, Sandra McCutcheon1, Wilfred Goldmann2, Angela Chong2, James Foster2, Silvia Sisó3, Lorenzo González3, Martin Jeffrey3, and Nora Hunter2 1 Neuropathogenesis Division, Roslin Institute, Compton, United Kingdom; 2 Neuropathogenesis Division, Roslin Institute, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom; and 3 Lasswade Laboratory, Veterinary Laboratories Agency, Penicuik, United Kingdom

The emergence of variant Creutzfeld-Jakob disease, following on from the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) epidemic, led to concerns about the potential risk of iatrogenic transmission of disease by blood transfusion and the introduction of costly control measures to protect blood supplies. We previously reported preliminary data demonstrating the transmission of BSE and natural scrapie by blood transfusion in sheep. The final results of this experiment, reported here, give unexpectedly high transmission rates by transfusion of 36% for BSE and 43% for scrapie. A proportion of BSE-infected tranfusion recipients (3 of 8) survived for up to 7 years without showing clinical signs of disease. The majority of transmissions resulted from blood collected from donors at more than 50% of the estimated incubation period. The high transmission rates and relatively short and consistent incubation periods in clinically positive recipients suggest that infectivity titers in blood were substantial and/or that blood transfusion is an efficient method of transmission. This experiment has established the value of using sheep as a model for studying transmission of variant Creutzfeld-Jakob disease by blood products in humans.



http://bloodjournal.hematologylibrary.org/cgi/content/abstract/112/12/4739?ct



PLEASE BE ADVISED, also, such 'significant objectionable conditions or practices' such as this, allow millions and millions of pounds of banned ruminant feed into commerce, such as the one in 2007. I suppose this is why they DO NOT release such data anymore i.e. in tonnage or pounds, much too embarrassing considering .005 grams is lethal for a cow. ...TSS

In 2007, in one weekly enforcement report, the fda recalled 10,000,000+ pounds of BANNED MAD COW FEED, 'in commerce', and i can tell you that most of it was fed out ;

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

REASON

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI

REASON

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007



http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html



Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST

snip... see listings and references of enormous amounts of banned mad cow protein 'in commerce' in 2006 and 2005 ;

see full text ;

Friday, April 25, 2008

Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed [Docket No. 2002N-0273] (Formerly Docket No. 02N-0273) RIN 0910-AF46



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/04/substances-prohibited-from-use-in.html



SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS



http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2008/02/specified-risk-materials-srm.html



0C3.01

Transmission of atypical BSE to Microcebus murinus, a non-human primate: Development of clinical symptoms and tissue distribution of PrPres

Background: Atypical BSE cases have been observed in Europe, Japan and North America. They differ in their PrPres profiles from those found in classical BSE. These atypical cases fall into 2 types, depending on the molecular mass of the unglycosylated PrPres band observed by Western blot: the L -type (lower molecular mass than the typical BSE cases) and H-type (higher molecular mass than the typical BSE cases).

Objectives and Methods: In order to see if the atypical BSE cases were transmissible to primates, either animals (were intracerebrally inoculated with 50 ul of a 10% brain homogenates of two atypical French BSE case, a H-type (2 males and 2 females) and a L-type (2 males and 2 females).

Results: Only one of the four lemurs challenged with H-type BSE died without clinical signs after 19 months post inoculation (mpi), whereas all the 4 animals inoculated with L -type BSE died at 19 mpi (2 males) and 22 mpi (2 females). Three months before their sacrifice, they developed blindness, tremor, abnormal posture, incoordinated movements, balance loss. Symptoms got worse according to the disease progression, until severe ataxia. The brain tissue were biochemically and immunocytochemically investigated for PrPres. For the H-type, spongiform changes without PrPres accumulation were observed in the brainstem. However Western blot analysis did not allow to detect PrPres into the brain. For the L-type, severe spongiosis was evidenced into the thalamus, the striatum, the mesencephalon, and the brainstem. whereas into the cortex the spongiosis was evidenced, but the Vacuolisation was weaker. Strong deposits of PrPres were detected by western blot, PET-blot and immunocytochemistry in the CNS: dense accumulation was observed into the thalamus, the striatum, and the hippocampus whereas in the cerebral cortex, PrPres was prominently accumulated in plaques. Western blot analysis also readily confirmed the presence of protease-resistant prion protein.

Conclusions: L-type infected lemurs showed survival times considerably shorter than for classical BSE strain, indicating that the disease is caused by a very virulent distinct prion strain in a model of non human primate.



http://www.neuroprion.org/resources/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2008/abstract-book-prion2008.pdf



P7.09

Biochemical screening for identification of atypical bse in belgium, 1999-present

Authors

Alexandre DobIy: Caroline Rodeghiero, Riet Geeroms; Stephanie Durand, Jessica De Sloovere, Emanuel Yanopdenbosch, Stefan Roels,

Content

Background: Recently atypical forms of BSE have been described. Western blot analyses showed that, in comparison to the classic BSE (C-type), they are demonstrable by a higher or lower molecular weight of the unglycosylated PrPres. They Viere thus named H-type and L-type BSE (L-type is also called BASE). In addition they show a lower proportion of diglycosylated PrPres than C-type. These emerging types represent different strains of BSE. They show unique incubation periods and histological lesions. Such types have been described on different continents. Indeed they might correspond to "sporadic" forms of BSE. In 2004 we already described one L-type in Belgium.

Objective: We retrospectively analysed the bovines at least 7-year-old in the Belgian archive of BSE ­diagnosed cattle in order to determine the prevalence of the two types of atypical BSE in Belgium.

Methods: We analysed homogenates from 39 bovines of 93 months old in median (min: 84, max: 181 months). The most recent one was diagnosed in 2006. We used Western blot with a panel of anti-PrP antibodies (Ab). They detect different regions of the PrP protein, from N-terminal to C-terminal: 12B2, 9A2, Sha31. SAFB4, 94B4. Their combination is aimed at an efficient typing diagnostic. We detected bound Ab with SuperSignal West Dura (Pierce) and analysed PrPres, signals with an image-analysis software (Quantity One, Bio-Rad).

Results: The results are still under analysis. We will detail the most crucial characteristics for typing PrPres. These include 1) the apparent molecular mass of the an-, mono- and diglycosylated bands, 2) the binding affinity to the five Ab (e.g.12B2 for H-type), 3) the presence of a fourth (unglycosylated) band and 4) the glycoprofile based on the relative proportions of the visible bands.

Discussion: The emergence of atypical types of BSE is partially due to a better knowledge of prion strains and more efficient diagnostic techniques. As the area in the brain where the PrPres is deposited can differ drastically between the types, it is essential to ascertain that the sampling techniques and analyses are adapted to these new types. As these new strains seem more virulent than classic types, they represent one of the next challenges in the field of prions.



http://www.neuroprion.org/resources/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2008/abstract-book-prion2008.pdf



Saturday, December 01, 2007 Phenotypic Similarity of Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy in Cattle and L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in a Mouse Model Volume 13, Number 12-December 2007 Research

snip...see full text ;



http://transmissible-mink-encephalopathy.blogspot.com/2007/12/phenotypic-similarity-of-transmissible.html



A New Prionopathy OR more of the same old BSe and sporadic CJD



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/08/new-prionopathy-or-more-of-same-old-bse.html



Sunday, April 20, 2008 Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center April 3, 2008

Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.

see full text ;



http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2008/04/progress-report-from-national-prion.html



ONE HUNDRED AND FIRST MEETING OF THE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY ADVISORY COMMITTEE Oct 23, 2008 at 9:00 AM



http://seac992007.blogspot.com/2008/10/one-hundred-and-first-meeting-of_23.html



http://flounder068.vox.com/library/post/one-hundred-and-first-meeting-of-the-spongiform-encephalopathy-advisory-committee.html



MAD COW DISEASE terminology UK c-BSE (typical), atypical BSE H or L, and or Italian L-BASE



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/03/mad-cow-disease-terminology-uk-c-bse.html


Please remember, the last two mad cows documented in the USA i.e. Alabama and Texas, both were of the 'atypical' BSE strain, and immediately after that, the USDA shut down the testing from 470,000 to 40,000 in the U.S. in 2007 out of about 35 million cattle slaughtered. also, science is showing that some of these atypical cases are more virulent to humans than the typical UK BSE strain ;

***Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.***

Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center

An Update from Stephen M. Sergay, MB, BCh & Pierluigi Gambetti, MD

April 3, 2008



http://www.aan.com/news/?event=read&article_id=4397&page=72.45.45



please see full text with additional comments and links @ ;



http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/



In this context, a word is in order about the US testing program. After the discovery of the first (imported) cow in 2003, the magnitude of testing was much increased, reaching a level of >400,000 tests in 2005 (Figure 4). Neither of the 2 more recently indigenously infected older animals with nonspecific clinical features would have been detected without such testing, and neither would have been identified as atypical without confirmatory Western blots. Despite these facts, surveillance has now been decimated to 40,000 annual tests (USDA news release no. 0255.06, July 20, 2006) and invites the accusation that the United States will never know the true status of its involvement with BSE.

In short, a great deal of further work will need to be done before the phenotypic features and prevalence of atypical BSE are understood. More than a single strain may have been present from the beginning of the epidemic, but this possibility has been overlooked by virtue of the absence of widespread Western blot confirmatory testing of positive screening test results; or these new phenotypes may be found, at least in part, to result from infections at an older age by a typical BSE agent, rather than neonatal infections with new "strains" of BSE. Neither alternative has yet been investigated.



http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm



CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006

The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.

The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.

These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."

Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.

USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end

http://www.upi.com/

CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...



http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm



PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE

Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM

"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."



http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0703&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=8125



To be published in the Proceedings of the Fourth International Scientific Congress in Fur Animal Production. Toronto, Canada, August 21-28, 1988

Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy Results from Feeding Infected Cattle

R.F. Marsh* and G.R. Hartsough

•Department of Veterinary Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin 53706; and ^Emba/Creat Lakes Ranch Service, Thiensville, Wisconsin 53092

Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME. Since previous incidences of TME were associated with common or shared feeding practices, we obtained a careful history of feed ingredients used over the past 12-18 months. The rancher was a "dead stock" feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle and a few horses. Sheep had never been fed.



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf



TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY



http://transmissible-mink-encephalopathy.blogspot.com/




BSE BASE MAD COW TESTING TEXAS, USA, AND CANADA



http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/



http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/05/agriculture-secretary-ed-schafer.html



http://downercattle.blogspot.com/



CJD RISING USA

The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.



http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html



There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection.

He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.



http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm



http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf



Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518